INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Ag and Applied Economics/Economics 707

Daniel W. Bromley Spring 2007

My purpose here is to help you develop an understanding of the institutional foundations of an economy. Much of advanced work in economics concerns the study of <u>economizing</u> and <u>economizing behavior</u>, while little of it concerns the extent to which an economy is socially constructed. The economy is not some magical and spontaneous entity created by divine inspiration with the goal of producing efficient allocations and happy people. Rather, the economy is built up from the convergence of three imperatives: (1) the need for collective rules of conduct arising from conflicts of interest, driven by scarcity, and enforced by the moral sanctions of collective opinion; (2) the need for rules of conduct arising from conflicts of interest, driven by scarcity, and enforced by the organized sanctions of state-sponsored coercion; and (3) the need for rules of conduct arising from conflicts of interest, driven by scarcity, and enforced by the accounting logic of profit and loss. In other words, the economy is the social realm in which <u>ethics</u>, jurisprudence, and <u>economizing</u> meet. The economy is always in the process of becoming. Here we learn about how that process works.

One understands the economy by understanding its ethical, legal, and economizing components. Institutional economics starts from the view that economizing behavior by individuals and firms is but a mechanistic facet of the more complex structure that gives rise to constellations of costs and benefits which inform that behavior. One cannot understand the economy by studying economizing behavior. One can only understand the economy by seeing that economizing behavior is grounded on prior ethical choices embodied in legislation, administrative rules, and jurisprudential decrees. Because there are an infinity of Pareto optimal outcomes—one for each possible structure of endowments and institutional arrangements—the efficiency doctrine of neoclassical economics is entirely self-referential and without recommendatory credibility as against other norms of individual or collective action—Kantian obligation, procedural transparency, equity (or Rawlsian justice).

Because economics is a policy science, it is important that one gain an understanding of the epistemological basis for policy prescriptions advanced by economists. And because economics is an empirical science, it is essential that the three classes of claims advanced by economists—descriptions, predictions, prescriptions—be capable of empirical testing. Many prescriptive assertions are predicated on a flawed application of deduction—a method of analysis that often fails to offer clear <u>explanations</u> for observed economic outcomes. Under deduction, one usually encounters not explanation but rather justification of (and a <u>rationalization for</u>) those outcomes that appear to be consistent with the circular concept of efficiency. The central concern here will be to gain an understanding of how applied economists come by the beliefs and assertions that they advance as <u>truth claims</u> about what is best to do ("optimal" or "efficient") in the policy arena. We will see that all public policy is

nothing but institutional change. With that in mind, we will explore the "new" institutional economics and will contrast its reliance on the circular concept of efficiency with classical institutional economics. This classical approach to the study of economic institutions will draw, in the main, on the approach of John R. Commons—an approach that stresses the legal foundations of capitalism, reasonable valuing, prospective volition, and the pragmatic evaluation of truth.

My book, <u>Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of</u> <u>Economic Institutions</u>, provides the primary conceptual grounding for the course. Other required readings are presented as elaborations of points made in <u>Sufficient Reason</u>.

II. EXPECTATIONS

Each class period will have one (rarely two) required reading(s) (indicated by *). The other readings are optional. Students will be assigned the responsibility of opening each class by offering a 10-15 minute exceptical account of the required reading for that period. These assignments will be made in advance. If there are two readings required for a period, two assignments will be made. The purpose of these opening comments is to launch us into a coherent discussion for that class period.

In addition, there will be 10-12 **gobbets** over the course of the semester. These writing opportunities entail the careful response to—or elaboration of—a question or statement. There is a one-page maximum length to the gobbets. The average score for the gobbets will comprise 40 percent of your grade.

You will write a <u>research paper</u> of not more than 15 pages in length. The specifics of the research paper will be spelled out in class. The paper will count for 60 percent of your grade. The research paper is due in class, Wednesday, May 2^{nd} .

My book <u>Sufficient Reason</u> is for sale at the University Bookstore. To avoid any appearance of profiting by having you buy my book, I will donate \$5 to the Taylor-Hibbard Club for each book purchased.

In addition, a reading packet is available at Pigwick Papers, 1401 University Avenue.

COURSE OUTLINE

SR = <u>SUFFICIENT REASON: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic</u> <u>Institutions</u>

I. INTRODUCTION

Monday, January 22:

*SR: Chapter 1: Prospective Volition Robbins: An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science

Wednesday, January 24:

*Philp, et al.: Preferences, Power, and the Determination of Working Hours Bowles: Endogenous Preferences Dwyer: the Alleged Value Neutrality of Economics Pollak: For Better or Worse Sen: Rational Fools Sen: Rationality and Social Choice

Friday, January 26:

*SR: Chapter 2: The Task At Hand Cooter and Rappoport: Were the Ordinalists Wrong? Rabin: Psychology and Economics Ramstad: Is a Transaction a Transaction? Simon: Rationality in Psychology and Economics Veblen: The Limitations of Marginal Utility

Monday, January 29:

*Rutherford: Institutional Economics Then and Now Hodgson: The Approach of Institutional Economics Mayhew: The Beginnings of Institutionalism

II. ON ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Wednesday, January 31:

*SR: Chapter 3: Understanding Institutions Hallowell: The Nature and Function of Property Putterman: The Firm as Association vs. The Firm as Commodity Schmid: Legal Foundations of the Market Simon: Organizations and Markets Sugden: Spontaneous Order Wilkins: The Neglected Intangible Asset

NO CLASS UNTIL February 14th.

Wednesday, February 14:

*North: Institutions Ben-Porath: The F-Connection Bromley: Markets Coase: The Nature of the Firm Neale: Institutions Sen: Markets and Freedom

Friday, February 16:

*SR: Chapter 4: The Content of Institutions Coase: The Problem of Social Cost Hodgson: Economics and Institutions Kronman: Contract Law and the State of Nature

Monday, February 19:

*Hall and Taylor: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
*Parto: Economic Activity and Institutions: Taking Stock
Samuels: The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Economics
Samuels: The Legal-Economic Nexus
Samuels: The Relation Between Legal and Economic Processes

Wednesday, February 21:

*SR: Chapter 5: Institutional Change Nelson and Sampat: Making Sense of Institutions in Economic Performance Rutherford: The Old and the New Institutionalism

Monday, February 26:

 *Ramstad: The Institutionalism of John R. Commons: Theoretical Foundations of a Volitional Economics
 Rutherford: J.R. Commons' Institutional Economics
 Whalen: John R. Commons' Institutional Economics: A Re-Examination

III. VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM

Wednesday, February 28:

*SR: Chapter 6: Fixing Belief Hoover: Pragmatism, Pragmaticism, and Economic Method Ramstad: A Pragmatist's Quest for Holistic Knowledge Stone: Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas

Monday, March 5:

*McCloskey: The Rhetoric of Economics Putnam: The Empiricist Background Putnam: The Entanglement of Fact and Value Putnam: Fact and Value in the World of Amartya Sen

Wednesday, March 7:

*SR: Chapter 7: Explaining

Field: On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models Field: The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics Ostrom: Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Monday, March 12:

*Stewart: Instrumental Reasoning in Economics Fiori: Alternative Visions of Change in Douglass North's New Institutionalism Kuhn: Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice Mirowski: The Philosophical Bases of Institutionalist Economics Webb: Dewey: Back to the Future Weston: Toward a Better Understanding of the Positive/Normative Distinction

Wednesday, March 14:

*SR: Chapter 8: Prescribing and Predicting Bromley: Economic Interests and Institutions Bromley: Ideology of Efficiency Mishan: How Valid are Economic Evaluations of Allocative Changes? Mishan: The Folklore of the Market

Monday, March 19:

*Olson: Why Some Nations are Rich and Others Poor Saraydar: The Conflation of Productivity and Efficiency in Economics Stiglitz: Whither Reform?

Wednesday, March 21:

*SR: Chapter 9: Volitional Pragmatism Mandelbaum: Purpose and Necessity in Social Theory

Monday, March 26:

*Commons: Institutional Economics Biddle: Purpose and Evolution Chasse: John R. Commons and the Democratic State

IV. VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AT WORK

Wednesday, March 28:

*SR: Chapter 10: Thinking as a Pragmatist *Posner: A Pragmatist Manifesto

SPRING BREAK

Monday, April 9:

*Ramstad: John R. Commons' Reasonable Value

Tribe: Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology? Tversky and Kahneman: Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions

Wednesday, April 11:

*SR: Chapter 11: Volitional Pragmatism and Explanation Nelson and Winter: An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change

Monday, April 16:

*SR: Chapter 12: Volitional Pragmatism and the Evolution of Institutions Dahlman: The Problem of Externality Drury: Locke and Nozick on Property Sax: Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property

Wednesday, April 18:

*Lin: The Needham Puzzle: Why the Industrial Revolution did not Originate in China Burawoy: The State and Economic Involution

Monday, April 23:

*Kuran: Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped Bromley: Reconstituting Economic Systems Hurst: Law and Markets in United States History Yousif: Development Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East & North Africa

No class April 25

Monday, April 30:

*SR: Chapter 13: Volitional Pragmatism and Economic Regulations Bromley: Regulatory Takings Bromley: Constitutional Political Economy Williams: Kant's Concept of Property

Wednesday, May 2:

*SR: Chapter 14: Sufficient Reason Johannson-Stenman: On the Problematic Link Between Ethics and Economic Policy Vatn and Bromley: Choices Without Prices Without Apologies

Monday, May 7:

Research Reports

Wednesday, May 9:

Research Reports

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Required readings are marked with *. The other readings are here for your reference.

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